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here  is  something  surreal  in  the 
implementation  process  of  the  new  Basel 
capital  framework  for  banks,  known  as 
Basel  III,  in  the  two  key  jurisdictions  of  the 
European  Union  and  the  United  States  (see 
BCBS,  2013b,  for  the  latest  official  update  by 
Basel  Supervisors).  On  the  one  hand,  financial 
officialdom leaves no opportunity unexploited to 
reaffirm full support for the new rules. On the 
other  hand,  implementation  appears  fraught 
with frictions and resistances, while the system is 
by  now  utterly  discredited  in  the  eyes  of 
financial  markets  and  academia  (e.g. 
Dewatripont  et  al.,  2010;  Goodhart,  2013a;  
Admati  &  Hellwig,  2013). Radical  criticism  has 
been voiced also by top regulators (e.g. Hoenig, 
2013;  Haldane  &  Madouros,  2012;  SRC,  2013a 
and 2013b, and similarly Tarullo, 2008 on Basel 
II,  which  in  its  rationale  and  basic  constituent 
elements is not much different from Basel III). 
What’s wrong with Basel capital 
standards? 
The  main  criticism  concerns  the  continuing 
reliance,  for  the  determination  of  capital 
requirements,  on  banks’  risk-weighted  assets 
(RWA)  calculated  with  unwieldy  probabilistic 
econometric  models  of  dubious  analytical 
foundation that leave ample room for gaming the 
system  and,  more  importantly,  that  are  by 
construction unable to deal with systemic shocks 
hitting the banking and financial system.  
That the system is open to gaming is confirmed 
by  irrefutable  empirical  evidence:  risk-based 
capital ratios cannot tell the difference between a 
sound bank and a bank that is about to fail (IMF, 
2009; FSA, 2010; Haldane, 2011) – as we were all 
reminded once again by the recent failure of the 
Dutch  mortgage  bank  SNS  Reaal,  which  went 
down overnight with adequate prudential ratios. 
This is precisely what had happened to Dexia in 
October  2011,  and  a  long  list  of  other  financial 
institutions  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the 
financial  crisis  in  2008.  And  indeed,  ratios  of 
RWA  to  total  assets  exhibit  large  variations 
across large banking groups – ranging between 
below  20%  and  above  60%  of  total  assets  – 
implying  that  similar  Basel  capital  ratios  may 
correspond  to  widely  different  actual  leverage 
ratios (Carmassi & Micossi, 2012). As noted by 
Tarullo  (2008,  p.  213):  “The  extent  of  national 
discretion  and  the  opaque  quality  of  the  IRB 
calculations breed countless opportunities for the 
exercise  of  regulatory  discretion  in  pursuit  of 
national competitive advantage.” 
These models are not only open to manipulation 
but are also utterly unreliable in their estimated 
probability distribution of losses on bank assets, 
which  are  the  basis  of  RWA  calculations. 
Financial  asset  prices  are  non-stationary  time 
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series that exhibit ‘jumps’ when the system is hit 
by  exogenous  shocks  radically  altering  private 
agents’ expectations and market sentiment. Since 
these  shocks  are  rare,  model  estimates  of  the 
probability of large losses on trading and credit 
risks  based  on  past  data  are  not  robust  and 
inevitably  underestimate  ‘tail’  risks; since  these 
shocks  typically  generate  strong  correlation  in 
asset price changes, they undermine the standard 
model  assumption  of  serial  independence  of 
individual asset (or asset class) prices.  
After  ignoring  the  issue  almost  entirely  during 
the negotiations leading to the Basel III Accord, 
Basel supervisors have awakened to the reality 
of wide divergences in RWA ratios to total assets 
for individual banks and are studying the issue 
as  part  of  their  new  (and  long-overdue) 
Regulatory Consistency Assessment. In January 
2013, they have issued their first analysis of RWA 
variation across banks for market risks, finding 
that it is only partly explained by differences in 
business  models  and  risk  management 
techniques,  but  also  reflects  “elements  of  the 
flexibility  provided  to  banks  and  supervisors 
within  the  Basel  framework”  (BCBS,  2013a,  p. 
11).  Preliminary  findings  on  banking  books 
already point to similar results. Similar exercises 
undertaken by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA)  have  come  to  similar  conclusions  (EBA, 
2013).   
Furthermore, as pointed out by Hellwig (2010), 
bank capital plays an  important systemic role 
that  was  overlooked  due  to  the  exclusive 
attention  paid  by  regulators  to  the 
microeconomic  dimension  of  banks’  behaviour. 
At the aggregate level, the dynamics of financial 
instability  is  a  function  of  i)  the  amount  of 
capital available to absorb incipient losses and ii) 
its ratio to total assets – the arithmetic inverse of 
aggregate leverage – which determines the speed 
of  deleveraging,  through  the  credit  multiplier, 
and fire sale of assets for the banking system as a 
whole, when a systemic shock shakes confidence. 
Thus,  a  large  aggregate  capital  cushion 
underpins  systemic  financial  stability  by 
reducing the need to sell assets under stress and 
making a run on the banking system less likely.  
Basel  rules  made  it  possible  for  the  banking 
system as a whole to operate with a very thin 
capital  cushion  and  a  very  high  aggregate 
leverage (Carmassi & Micossi, 2012), laying the 
basis  for  the  subsequent  implosion  of  credit 
when the financial crisis struck. The problem has 
not been resolved by Basel III, which will permit 
individual banks to keep a capital buffer as low 
as 3% of total assets – corresponding to a total 
leverage ratio above 33 – and the banking system 
de  facto  to  operate  with  an  overall  capital 
cushion below 5% of total assets. 
In this context, the new Liquidity Coverage and 
Net  Stable  Funding  ratios  are  but  another 
manifestation  of  low  confidence  in  Basel  rules’ 
ability to protect financial stability. And indeed, 
Basel capital ratios look solely at the banks’ asset 
side,  while  a  key  factor  in  prompting  financial 
instability  was  reckless  business  relying  on 
volatile  short-term  funding  to  finance  risky 
trading  positions  on  own  account  in  capital 
markets (Carmassi & Micossi 2012; Admati & 
Hellwig  2013;  Viñals  et  al.  2013,  )..  These 
additional prudential requirements are meant to 
fill the hole by means of liquidity requirements 
and  constraints  on  maturity  transformation. 
However,  far  from  responding  to  a  clear 
rationale, they have simply applied new patches 
on  a  crumbling  construction.  Their  costs  and 
impact  on  banks’  operations  have  not  been 
evaluated but may be substantial, and the risk is 
substantial that fierce industry lobbying, already 
under  way,  will  lead  over  time  to  their 
emasculation.  
As  if  this  were  not  enough,  important 
jurisdictions  are  also  intervening  directly  to 
prohibit  trading  on  own  account  (the  Volcker 
rule  in  the  United  States)  or  impose  structural 
separation  between  commercial  (‘utility’)  and 
investment banking (following the 2011 ‘Vickers 
Report’ issued by the Independent Commission 
on Banking (ICB) in the United Kingdom). In the 
European  Union,  the  2012  ‘Liikanen  Report’ 
prepared  by  the  High-Level  Expert  Group 
(HLEG)  has  brought  up  for  consideration  the 
possibility  of  segregating  banks’  trading 
activities  into  a  separate  legal  entity  –  albeit 
tortuous decision procedures are there to ensure 
that it doesn’t happen in practice.   
Finally, the Basel system has failed to create a 
level  playing  field  for  ‘internationally  active’ 
banks, as divergent implementation by national 
supervisors  has  increasingly  ‘balkanised’  the 
field across the main jurisdictions – a process that 
Basel III special treatments will worsen. Suffice A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO BASEL III PRUDENTIAL CAPITAL RULES | 3 
 
to  say  here  that  the  variation  between 
jurisdictions in the ratios of regulatory capital to 
total  assets  permitted  under  the  new  rules 
potentially  exceeds  100%1  –  which  explains 
mounting uneasiness about the system amongst 
top bankers.  
Meanwhile,  the  United  States  has  yet  to 
complete the move to Basel II capital standards, 
while  its  regulatory  agencies  apply  different 
backstop  capital  ratios  out  of  the  Basel 
framework for different categories of banks; and 
the new proposed rules for the implementation 
of Basel III already provide new loopholes e.g. in 
the treatment of government-sponsored agencies 
and  securitisation  (BCBS,  2012a).  In  the 
European Union, the final compromise reached 
by  Council  and  Parliament  entails  important 
departures  from  Basel  III  rule-book  –  both  as 
regards  the  definition  of  capital  and  the 
application  of  internal  models  (BCBS,  2012b)  – 
while  the  room  for  national  discretion  to  vary 
prudential  capital  ratios  has  been  increased 
(BCBS, 2013b). Even the mild 3% back stop for 
the unweighted capital ratio has been postponed 
to an indefinite future. Not surprisingly, the final 
compromise  between  Council  and  Parliament 
has  been  likened  to  a  piece  of  Emmenthaler 
cheese, full with holes (Lannoo, 2013). In the end 
Europe has neither the back-stop capital ratio nor 
the  prompt  corrective  action  (PCA)  that  arm 
supervisors  in  the  US  system  with  effective 
power to intervene at an early stage when a bank 
weakens dangerously.  
In  sum,  Basel  III  has  made  some  progress  in 
strengthening  the  definition  of  capital  and 
raising capital requirements but has not resolved 
the fundamental problem posed by reference to 
RWA  calculated  by  the  banks  with  flawed 
                                                   
1  Taking  into  account  the  capital  conservation  buffer 
(2.5%), the countercyclical buffer (up to 2.5%), the SIFI 
surcharge (to be determined, up to 2.5%), the room left to 
national  supervisors  to  modify  model  results  in  RWA 
calculations  for  individual  assets  classes  (attendant 
’multipliers’  may vary  between  3  and  5.5),  and  model 
manipulation by the banks to reduce RWA (as we were 
all reminded once again when a large European cross-
border  bank  recently  announced  they  were  aiming  at 
RWA  reductions  of  €45  billion  in  order  to  economise 
capital). Ample room for variation was already a feature 
of Basel II but has increased with Basel III. 
internal models.2 It has left too much discretion 
to  national  supervisors  and  has  left  them 
exposed to capture because of its opacity. And it 
has failed to provide markets with a readable set 
of metrics of banks’ strength as a basis for Pillar 3 
market  discipline.  Piecemeal  fixtures  won’t 
suffice; a complete overhaul of the system is in 
order. 
More broadly, the analyses of bank failures over 
the past five or six years confirm that failure was 
normally the result of high-risk business models 
adopted for some time before the crisis, and that 
what made the financial institutions vulnerable 
was  a  combination  of  high-leverage,  volatile 
funding  and  risky  bets  in  capital  markets 
(Goodhart  2013b,  Viñals  et  al.,  2013).  By 
concentrating  on  the  asset  side  of  the  banks’ 
balance  sheets,  the  Basel  III  framework  is 
overlooking much of the action that may bring a 
bank to the brink. It is not surprising, then, that 
many other patches are required to close holes all 
over the place, and that in response to industry 
pressures  these  extra  measures  are  then 
diversified  and  adapted  into  an 
incomprehensible  conundrum.  The  result  is  a 
cumbersome,  distortive  and  inefficient 
prudential  system  that  cannot  be  repaired  and 
must be scrapped.  
A fresh start  
In our CEPS study, Jacopo Carmassi and I (2012) 
outlined  a  logical  and  complete  prudential 
system for banking that is much simpler and far 
less distortive, which entails five components: 
i)  Capital  requirements  set  as  a  straight  ratio 
between common equity and total assets. Its 
level should be (gradually) raised to between 
7% and 10% of total assets, based on systemic 
stability  considerations.  The  new  capital 
ratio,  with  equity  valued  at  market  rates, 
would be used as a reference in both Pillar 2 
                                                   
2  Increased  reliance  on  advanced  internal  models 
weakens the system even further since under the IRB the 
banks were required to estimate only the probability of 
default  while  the  advanced  internal  model  system 
estimates all the parameters (probability of default, loss 
given default and the correlation between the portfolio 
of  loans  and  the  macro-economic  risk  factor);  see 
Dewatripont et al., 2010, p. 83. 4 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
(supervisory  review)  and  Pillar  3  (market 
discipline).3 
ii)  Under  Pillar  2,  prudential  capital  ratios 
would  be  used  to  trigger  enhanced 
supervisory review and bind supervisors to 
a set of predetermined corrective actions of 
increasing severity,  when  the  bank’s  capital 
ratio  falls  below  certain  pre-specified 
thresholds,  as  under  the  current  US  FDIC 
system of PCA.  
iii) In  order  to  eradicate  moral  hazard,  the 
system must be ‘closed’ by a procedure for 
bank  resolution,  to  be  triggered  when  a 
bank’s capital falls beyond repair (Carmassi 
et  al.,  2010).  Resolution  costs  would  fall 
primarily  on  shareholders  and  unsecured 
creditors  (‘least  cost’  resolution,  benefiting 
both the insurance fund and taxpayers), but 
even  secured  creditors  and  uninsured 
depositors would not be sure to escape. 
iv) The correction for risk-taking by individual 
banks  would  be  entrusted  to  deposit 
insurance, that would cover retail depositors 
only up to a maximum amount (€100,000, as 
already  adopted  by  European  regulators, 
seems a reasonable standard). Fees would be 
determined on the basis of banks’ overall risk 
profile  and  systemic  relevance,  as  will  be 
described  below,  and  be  paid  ex  ante,  thus 
generating  over  time  an  insurance  fund  of 
credible  size  to  meet  emerging  losses 
(incurred  by  individual  banks,  even  very 
large ones). Of course, no fund could ever be 
sufficient  to  meet  the  costs  of  a  systemic 
banking crisis. 
v)  Under  Pillar  3  (market  discipline),  solvency 
rules would be completed by the obligation 
for  banks  to  issue  a  substantial  amount  of 
contingent  capital  (Co.Co.),  i.e.  debentures 
convertible  into  equity.  These  securities 
                                                   
3  On  this,  Goodhart  (2013b)  notes:  “in  view  of  the 
incentive of shareholders/management to focus on the 
Return on Equity (RoE), rather than the Return on Assets 
(RoA),  and  of  the  existing  debt  overhang,  any 
requirement for a higher ratio will provoke deleveraging 
rather  than  equity  re-build.  The  need  instead  is  to 
require  each  bank  to  hold  a  higher  absolute  level  of 
equity,  related  to  its  initial  (risk-weighted)  assets,  and 
prevent  pay-outs  to  shareholders  and/or  management 
until that level is attained.”   
should  be  designed  so  as  to  create  strong 
incentives  for  bank  managers  and 
shareholders to issue equity at an early stage, 
when capital weakens, in order to pre-empt 
conversion  (Calomiris  &  Herring,  2011). 
Should  nonetheless  losses  emerge  and 
conversion  takes  place,  this  ‘bail-in’  capital 
would  enhance  the  equity  cushion  to  cover 
losses.  It  is  important  that  conversion  be 
triggered automatically upon crossing certain 
market-based  capital  indicators  and  not  be 
left to supervisory discretion (as put forward 
in a misguided proposal by the Commission, 
2012). 
This set of rules should apply to all banks and, 
when a bank is part of a broader financial group, 
to the entire group (since the group is likely to 
have  benefited  from  the  benefits  of  a  banking 
charter  within  its  belly).  Within  the  European 
Union, these rules should be applied by the new 
single supervisory authority under construction, 
and  should  include  a  supranational  deposit 
insurance and resolution authority (which is yet 
not agreed upon).  
Under this system, there would be no need for 
special rules on liquidity or funding structures, 
whose  adequacy  would  be  concretely  verified 
within  the  supervisory  review  of  the  banks 
covering the overall business model, its riskiness 
and  its  sustainability.  There  would  also  be  no 
need  for  special  restrictions  on  particular 
activities  and  operations,  since  supervisors 
would be able to penalise risk-taking as needed 
with deposit insurance fees. 
Mimicking the FDIC deposit insurance 
system 
The system just outlined places a special burden 
on  deposit  insurance,  which  becomes  the  sole 
instrument for charging individual banks for the 
risk they pose for the deposit insurance fund and 
financial stability in general. Therefore, it seems 
useful to recall that this approach already has an 
important  precedent  in  the  system  of  deposit 
insurance developed in the United States by the 
FDIC. 
Under  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Act,  the 
deposit  insurance  system  is  risk-based,  i.e. 
deposit  insurance  fees  are  determined  on  the 
probability that an institution may cause a loss to 
the  deposit  insurance  fund  due  to  the A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO BASEL III PRUDENTIAL CAPITAL RULES | 5 
 
“compositions  and  concentration”  of  the 
institution’s  assets  and  liabilities. More  precisely, 
deposit  insurance  fees  are  calculated  with 
reference  to  two  factors  (I  am  simplifying  the 
description to the essential elements): 
i)  An  assessment  base  calculated  from  the 
difference  between  total  assets  and  Tier  1 
capital, which entails lowering fees for better 
capitalised  institutions.4  A  debt  adjustment 
factor  grants  a  reduction  in  fees  to 
institutions with a cushion of unsecured debt, 
due  to  the  latter’s  loss-absorbing  capacity. 
Surcharges are applied, on the other hand, to 
institutions holding unsecured debt issued by 
depository  institutions,  and  to  large 
institutions  that  are  not  well  capitalised  or 
with a low CAMELS rating (described in the 
ensuing indent) when their brokered deposits 
exceed 10% of domestic deposits. 
ii)  An assessment rate that is based on the risk 
profile of the bank and is calculated on the 
basis  of  a  combination  of  capital  and  risk 
indicators. The latter, known as the CAMELS 
ratings,  cover  capital,  assets,  management, 
earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market 
risks;  for  large  institutions  and  highly 
complex  institutions,  assessment  rates  also 
include  certain  forward-looking  measures, 
combined in two different ‘score-cards’.5 
The  important  feature  of  this  approach  is  that 
deposit  insurance  fees  entail  a  comprehensive 
supervisory  assessment  of  the  bank’s  business 
model,  quality  of  management  and  risk-
exposure,  which  is  partly  based  on  objective 
indicators and partly on a subjective evaluation 
by supervisors. The overall assessment includes 
the  potential  threat  posed  by  each  individual 
institution  to  overall  financial  stability.  The 
individual components’ contribution to the final 
calculation  of  the  fee  are  publicly  known  in 
advance, albeit the precise result for each bank 
involves some discretionary elements that cannot 
                                                   
4  This  provision  was  introduced  by  the  Dodd-Frank 
legislation of 2010. Previously, the assessment base was 
represented by deposits.  
5 Over the years, and notably since the financial crisis, 
the  system  has  been  refined  to  ensure  that  the 
assessment  rates  reflect  risk  differences  between  banks 
and banking groups with sufficiently steep variations in 
assessment rates.  
be ‘arbitraged’ away by means of balance sheet 
manipulation.  
In sum, under this comprehensive approach, the 
deposit insurance fee seeks to place a price on all 
aspects of risk-taking by an individual institution 
and  their  systemic  relevance.  The  system  may 
well be subject to improvement – and indeed has 
periodically  been  adjusted  in  response  to 
practical experience – in order to make sure that 
emerging risk in evolving bank business models 
are recognised and properly accounted for, but 
once  this  is  done  it  seems  to  require  no 
complements  in  the  form  of  ad  hoc  capital 
surcharges  or  special  constraints  on  banking 
activities or legal structure.  
The ‘arbitrage’ objection to a straight 
prudential capital ratio 
A  main  objection  to  this  approach  is  that  the 
elimination  of  all  risk  adjustment  in  the 
determination of prudential capital ratios would 
create  fresh  opportunities  for  regulatory 
arbitrage  by  banks  seeking  to  maximise  their 
returns on equity. This is an old argument that 
played a paramount role in the demise of Basel I 
and the adoption of risk-based capital ratios in 
Basel II (Tarullo, 2008). And it also happens to be 
completely groundless.   
The  argument  first  made  its  appearance  with 
reference to Basel I, which was based, as may be 
recalled,  on  a  limited  number  of  risk  buckets, 
mainly  identified  on  the  basis  of  the 
counterparty.6 Regulators, academics and policy 
analysts soon started  to  argue  that  banks  were 
picking the riskiest assets within each bucket in 
order  to  maximise  returns  (albeit  with  scanty 
empirical confirmation; cf. Tarullo, 2008).7 Banks, 
meanwhile, denounced the system as inefficient 
and  costly  for  imposing  a  wasteful  excess  of 
                                                   
6  E.g.  public  sector  entities,  banks,  mortgages  on 
residential  property,  private  sector  loans,  with  further 
adjustment  for  the  jurisdiction,  e.g.  OECD  vs.  non-
OECD. 
7 Much larger opportunities for arbitrage were probably 
offered by the binary character of some rules (as with the 
provision  that  required  capital  only  for  loans  with 
maturity of one year or longer, which according to some 
studies explained the explosion of short-term lending to 
some high-rated non-OECD countries in the 1990s) and 
by large gaps in coverage created by securitisation, as the 
financial crisis later on made all too clear (Tarullo, 2008).  6 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
capital.  Eventually,  they  all  converged  on  the 
notion that capital ratios should be finely tuned 
to  the  risk  characteristics  of  individual  assets, 
measured  with  the  new  internal  ratings-based 
(IRB)  approach,  opening  the  way  to  the  use  of 
banks’  risk  management  models  for  the 
determination  of  prudential  capital.  The 
unequivocal  effect  of  the  new  system  was  to 
lower capital requirements for large cross-border 
banks  (Carmassi  &  Micossi,  2012)  while 
opportunities  for  arbitrage,  far  from  being 
closed, were magnified, as has been recalled. 
What  should  have  been  clear  from  the  start  is 
that  the  arbitrage  objection  assumes  that  the 
bankers’  only  goal  is  to  maximise  returns 
regardless of risk. Unless we believe that bankers’ 
utility function is by nature characterised by zero 
risk-aversion – a rather worrisome presumption, 
which  however  to  my  knowledge  has  no 
empirical confirmation – the only explanation for 
that kind of behaviour can be perverse incentives 
created  by  regulation  and  systematically 
encouraging bankers to take reckless risks. And 
indeed there is plenty of evidence that legal rules 
and  financial  market  regulation  have  created 
moral  hazard  by  shielding  bankers  from  the 
consequences  of  their  mistakes  (or  reckless 
gambles).  This  is,  for  instance,  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  legal  provision  of  limited 
liability; of the promise that in case of difficulty, 
the bank will enjoy special access to the central 
bank  liquidity  facilities;  and  of  the  implicit 
promise that the bank will not be allowed to fail.  
In  sum,  reckless  risk-taking  by  bankers  is  the 
result  of  perverse  incentives  stemming  from 
regulation  and  not,  in  the  main,  of  prudential 
capital  rules.  Shifting  to  a  straight,  risk-
unadjusted  capital  ratio  would  reduce  internal 
arbitrage  opportunities,  relative  to  the  present 
system,  as  current  incentives  for  the  banks  to 
manipulate internal risk management models, in 
order  to  reduce  capital  absorption,  would 
disappear. 
The notion, in this context, that a straight capital 
ratio could be used in combination with a risk-
adjusted ratio (e.g. as called for in the Liikanen 
Report 2012; see also Véron, 2013) also appears 
ill-conceived,  once  it  is  accepted  that  all  risk-
adjustment  for  correcting  perverse  incentive 
stemming  from  the  banking  charter  may  be 
entrusted  to  a  properly  designed  deposit 
insurance  fee.  Once  that  is  done,  continuing 
reference  also  to  a  risk-adjusted  capital  ratio 
would  only  send  confusing  signals  while 
creating room to manipulate the system.  
Conclusions 
The  Basel  framework  for  bank  prudential 
requirements  is  deeply  flawed;  the  Basel  III 
revision has failed to correct these flaws and in 
the  main  has  made  the  system  even  more 
complicated, opaque and open to manipulation. 
In  practice,  the  present  system  does  not  offer 
regulators and financial markets a reliable capital 
standard for banks; its divergent implementation 
in the main jurisdictions of the European Union 
and the United States has broken the market into 
special fiefdoms governed by national regulators 
in  response  to  untoward  special  interests.  The 
time  is  ripe  to  stop  tinkering  with  minor 
adjustment and revisions in the hope of rescuing 
the  system,  because  the  system  cannot  be 
rescued. 
Reference  to  risk-weighted  assets  calculated  by 
banks  with  their  internal  risk  management 
models  for  the  determination  of  banks’ 
prudential capital must be abandoned, together 
with predominant attention to the asset side of 
banks  in  correcting  for  risk  exposure.  The 
alternative may be provided by a combination of 
a straight capital ratio and a properly designed 
deposit insurance system. It is a logical, complete 
and  much  less  distortive  alternative;  it  would 
serve better the cause of financial stability as well 
as  the  interest  of  the  banks  in  creating  clear, 
transparent and level playing field. 
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